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Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable
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Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, and Hans Georg Seedig
Abstract
We conduct a computational analysis of fair and optimal partitions in additively
separable hedonic games. We show that, for strict preferences, a Pareto optimal
partition can be found in polynomial time while verifying whether a given parti-
tion is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete, even when preferences are symmetric and
strict. Moreover, computing a partition with maximum egalitarian or utilitarian
social welfare or one which is both Pareto optimal and individually rational is NP-
hard. We also prove that checking whether there exists a partition which is both
Pareto optimal and envy-free is Σ
p
2-complete. Even though an envy-free partition
and a Nash stable partition are both guaranteed to exist for symmetric preferences,
checking whether there exists a partition which is both envy-free and Nash stable is
NP-complete.
1 Introduction
Ever since the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior in 1944, coalitions have played a central role within game theory. The
crucial questions in coalitional game theory are which coalitions can be expected to form
and how the members of coalitions should divide the proceeds of their cooperation. Tradi-
tionally the focus has been on the latter issue, which led to the formulation and analysis of
concepts such as Gillie’s core, the Shapley value, or the bargaining set. Which coalitions are
likely to form is commonly assumed to be settled exogenously, either by explicitly specifying
the coalition structure, a partition of the players in disjoint coalitions, or, implicitly, by as-
suming that larger coalitions can invariably guarantee better outcomes to its members than
smaller ones and that, as a consequence, the grand coalition of all players will eventually
form.
The two questions, however, are clearly interdependent: the individual players’ payoffs
depend on the coalitions that form just as much as the formation of coalitions depends on
how the payoffs are distributed.
Coalition formation games, as introduced by Dre`ze and Greenberg (1980), provide a
simple but versatile formal model that allows one to focus on coalition formation as such.
In many situations it is natural to assume that a player’s appreciation of a coalition structure
only depends on the coalition he is a member of and not on how the remaining players are
grouped. Initiated by Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), much of
the work on coalition formation now concentrates on these so-called hedonic games.
The main focus in hedonic games has been on notions of stability for coalition struc-
tures such as Nash stability, individual stability, contractual individual stability, or core
stability and characterizing conditions under which they are guaranteed to be non-empty
(see, e.g., Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002). The most prominent examples of hedonic
1A preliminary version of this work was invited for presentation in the session ‘Cooperative Games and
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2312/6-1 (within the European Science Foundation’s EUROCORES program LogICCC) and BR 2312/7-1.
games are two-sided matching games in which only coalitions of size two are admissi-
ble (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
General coalition formation games have also received attention from the artificial intelli-
gence community, where the focus has generally been on computing partitions that give rise
to the greatest social welfare (see, e.g., Sandholm et al., 1999). The computational com-
plexity of hedonic games has been investigated with a focus on the complexity of computing
stable partitions for different models of hedonic games (Ballester, 2004; Dimitrov et al.,
2006; Cechla´rova´, 2008). We refer to Hajdukova´ (2006) for a critical overview.
Among hedonic games, additively separable hedonic games (ASHGs) are a particularly
natural and succinct representation in which each player has a value for every other player
and the value of a coalition to a particular player is computed by simply adding his values
of the players in his coalition.
Additive separability satisfies a number of desirable axiomatic properties (Barbera` et al.,
2004). ASHGs are the non-transferable utility generalization of graph games studied by
Deng and Papadimitriou (1994). Sung and Dimitrov (2010) showed that for ASHGs, check-
ing whether a core stable, strict-core stable, Nash stable, or individually stable partition
exists is NP-hard. Dimitrov et al. (2006) obtained positive algorithmic results for subclasses
of additively separable hedonic games in which each player divides other players into friends
and enemies. Branzei and Larson (2009) examined the tradeoff between stability and social
welfare in ASHGs.
Contribution In this paper, we analyze concepts from fair division in the context of
coalition formation games. We present the first systematic examination of the complexity
of computing and verifying optimal partitions of hedonic games, specifically ASHGs. We
examine various standard criteria from the social sciences: Pareto optimality, utilitarian
social welfare, egalitarian social welfare, and envy-freeness (see, e.g., Moulin, 1988).
In Section 3, we show that computing a partition with maximum egalitarian social welfare
is NP-hard. Similarly, computing a partition with maximum utilitarian social welfare is NP-
hard in the strong sense even when preferences are symmetric and strict.
In Section 4, the complexity of Pareto optimality is studied. We prove that checking
whether a given partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete in the strong sense, even
when preferences are strict and symmetric. By contrast, we present a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for computing a Pareto optimal partition when preferences are strict.2 Interestingly,
computing an individually rational and Pareto optimal partition is NP-hard in general.
In Section 5, we consider complexity questions regarding envy-free partitions. Checking
whether there exists a partition which is both Pareto optimal and envy-free is shown to
be Σp2-complete. We present an example which exemplifies the tradeoff between satisfying
stability (such as Nash stability) and envy-freeness and use the example to prove that
checking whether there exists a partition which is both envy-free and Nash stable is NP-
complete even when preferences are symmetric.
Our computational hardness results imply computational hardness of equivalent prob-
lems for hedonic coalition nets (Elkind and Wooldridge, 2009).
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide the terminology and notation required for our results.
2Thus, we identify a natural problem in coalitional game theory where verifying a possible solution is
presumably harder than actually finding one.
2.1 Hedonic games
A hedonic coalition formation game is a pair (N,P) where N is a set of players and P is a
preference profile which specifies for each player i ∈ N the preference relation %i, a reflexive,
complete and transitive binary relation on set Ni = {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S}.
S ≻i T denotes that i strictly prefers S over T and S ∼i T that i is indifferent between
coalitions S and T . A partition pi is a partition of players N into disjoint coalitions. By
pi(i), we denote the coalition in pi which includes player i.
A game (N,P) is separable if for any player i ∈ N and any coalition S ∈ Ni and for any
player j not in S we have the following: S∪{j} ≻i S if and only if {i, j} ≻i {i}; S∪{j} ≺i S
if and only if {i, j} ≺i {i}; and S ∪ {j} ∼i S if and only if {i, j} ∼i {i}.
In an additively separable hedonic game (N,P), each player i ∈ N has value vi(j)
for player j being in the same coalition as i and if i is in coalition S ∈ Ni, then i gets
utility
∑
j∈S\{i} vi(j). For coalitions S, T ∈ Ni, S %i T if and only if
∑
j∈S\{i} vi(j) ≥∑
j∈T\{i} vi(j).
A preference profile is symmetric if vi(j) = vj(i) for any two players i, j ∈ N and is
strict if vi(j) 6= 0 for all i, j ∈ N such that i 6= j. We consider ASHGs (additively separable
hedonic games) in this paper. Unless mentioned otherwise, all our results are for ASHGs.
2.2 Fair and optimal partitions
In this section, we formulate concepts from the social sciences, especially the literature on
fair division, for the context of hedonic games. A partition pi satisfies individual rationality if
each player does as well as by being alone, i.e., for all i ∈ N , pi(i) %i {i}. For a utility-based
hedonic game (N,P) and partition pi, we will denote the utility of player i ∈ N by upi(i).
The different notions of fair or optimal partitions are defined as follows.3
1. The utilitarian social welfare of a partition is defined as the sum of individual utilities
of the players: uut(pi) =
∑
i∈N upi(i). A maximum utilitarian partition maximizes the
utilitarian social welfare.
2. The elitist social welfare is given by the utility of the player that is best off: uel(pi) =
max{upi(i) | i ∈ N}. A maximum elitist partition maximizes the utilitarian social
welfare.
3. The egalitarian social welfare is given by the utility of the agent that is worst off:
ueg(pi) = min{upi(i) | i ∈ N}. A maximum egalitarian partition maximizes the egali-
tarian social welfare.
4. A partition pi of N is Pareto optimal if there exists no partition pi′ of N which Pareto
dominates pi, that is for all i ∈ N , pi′(i) %i pi(i) and there exists at least one player
j ∈ N such that j ∈ N , pi′(j) ≻j pi(j).
5. Envy-freeness is a notion of fairness. In an envy-free partition, no player has an
incentive to replace another player.
For the sake of brevity, we will call all the notions described above “optimality criteria”
although envy-freeness is rather concerned with fairness than optimality. We consider the
following computational problems with respect to the optimality criteria defined above.
3All welfare notions considered in this paper (utilitarian, elitist, and egalitarian) are based on the inter-
personal comparison of utilities. Whether this assumption can reasonably be made is debatable.
Optimality: Given (N,P) and a partition pi of N , is pi optimal?
Existence: Does an optimal partition for a given (N,P) exist?
Search: If an optimal partition for a given (N,P) exists, find one.
Existence is trivially true for all criteria of optimality concepts. By the definitions, it
follows that there exist partitions which satisfy maximum utilitarian social welfare, elitist
social welfare, and egalitarian social welfare respectively.
3 Complexity of maximizing social welfare
In this section, we examine the complexity of maximizing social welfare in ASHGs. We first
observe that computing a maximum utilitarian partition for strict and symmetric preferences
is NP-hard because it is equivalent to the NP-hard problem of maximizing agreements in
the context of correlation clustering (Bansal et al., 2004).
Theorem 1. Computing a maximum utilitarian partition is NP-hard in the strong sense
even with symmetric and strict preferences.
Computing a maximum elitist partition is much easier. For any player i, let F (i) = {j |
vi(j) > 0} be the set of players which i strictly likes and f(i) =
∑
j∈F (i) vi(j). Both F (i) and
f(i) can be computed in linear time. Let k ∈ N be the player such that f(k) ≥ f(i) for all
i ∈ N . Then pi = {{{k}∪F (k)}, N \{{k}∪F (k)}} is a partition which maximizes the elitist
social welfare. As a corollary, we can verify whether a partition pi has maximum elitist social
welfare by computing a partition pi∗ with maximum elitist social welfare and comparing
uel(pi) with uel(pi
∗). Just like maximizing the utilitarian social welfare, maximizing the
egalitarian social welfare is hard.
Theorem 2. Computing a maximum egalitarian partition is NP-hard in the strong sense.
Proof. We provide a polynomial-time reduction from the NP-hard problem MaxMinMa-
chineCompletionTime (Woeginger, 1997) in which an instance consists of a set of m
identical machinesM = {M1, . . . ,Mm}, a set of n independent jobs J = {J1, . . . , Jn} where
job Ji has processing time pi. The problem is to allot jobs to the machines such that
the minimum processing time (without machine idle times) of all machines is maximized.
Let I be an instance of MaxMinMachineCompletionTime and let P =
∑n
i=1 pi. From
I we construct an instance I ′ of EgalSearch. The ASHG for instance I ′ consists of
N = {i | Mi ∈ M} ∪ {si | Ji ∈ J} and the preferences of the players are as follows: for all
i = 1, . . .m and all j = 1, . . . , n let vi(sj) = pj and vsj (i) = P . Also, for 1 ≤ i, i
′ ≤ m, i 6= i′
let vi(i
′) = −(P +1) and for 1 ≤ j, j′ ≤ n, j 6= j′ let vsj (vsj′ ) = 0. Each player i corresponds
to machine Mi and each player sj corresponds to job Jj .
Let pi be the partition which maximizes ueg(pi). We show that players 1, . . . ,m are in
separate coalitions and each player sj is in pi(i) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m. We can do so by
proving two claims. The first claim is that for i, j ∈ {1, . . .m} such that i 6= j, we have
that i /∈ pi(j). The second claim is that each player sj is in a coalition with a player i. The
proofs of the claims are omitted due to space limitations.
A job allocation Alloc(pi) corresponds to a partition pi where sj is in pi(i) if job Jj is
assigned to Mi for all j and i. Note that the utility upi(i) =
∑
sj∈pi(i)
vi(sj) =
∑
sj∈pi(i)
pj
of a player corresponds to the total completion time of all jobs assigned to Mi according
to Alloc(pi). Let pi∗ be a maximum egalitarian partition. Assume that there is another
partition pi′ and Alloc(pi′) induces a strictly greater minimum completion time. We know
that upi∗(sj) = upi′′(sj) = P for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n and upi∗(i) ≤ P for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. But then
from the assumption we have ueg(pi
′) > ueg(pi
∗) which is a contradiction.
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 · · · z|R|−2 z|R|−1 z|R|
y1 y2 y3 y|S|
x1 x2 x3 x|S|
w1 w2 w3 w|S|
· · ·
1
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
−1 −1 −1 −1
Figure 1: A graph representation of an ASHG derived from an instance of E3C. The (sym-
metric) utilities are given as edge weights. Some edges and labels are omitted: All edges
between any ys and zr have weight 1 if r ∈ s. All zr
′
, zr
′′
with r′ 6= r′′ are connected with
weight 1|R|−1 . All other edges missing in the complete undirected graph have weight −7.
4 Complexity of Pareto optimality
We now consider the complexity of computing a Pareto optimal partition. The complexity
of Pareto optimality has already been considered in several settings such as house alloca-
tion (Abraham et al., 2005). Bouveret and Lang (2008) examined the complexity of Pareto
optimal allocations in resource allocation problems. We show that checking whether a par-
tition is Pareto optimal is hard even under severely restricted settings.
Theorem 3. The problem of checking whether a partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-
complete in the strong sense, even when preferences are symmetric and strict.
Proof. The reduction is from the NP-complete problem E3C (EXACT-3-COVER) to decid-
ing whether a given partition is Pareto dominated by another partition or not. Recall that
in E3C, an instance is a pair (R,S), where R = {1, . . . , r} is a set and S is a collection of
subsets of R such that |R| = 3m for some positive integer m and |s| = 3 for each s ∈ S.
The question is whether there is a sub-collection S′ ⊆ S which is a partition of R.
It is known that E3C remains NP-complete even if each r ∈ R occurs in at most three
members of S (Garey and Johnson, 1979). Let (R,S) be an instance of E3C. (R,S) can be
reduced to an instance ((N,P), pi), where (N,P) is an ASHG defined in the following way.
Let N = {ws, xs, ys | s ∈ S}∪{zr | r ∈ R}. The players preferences are symmetric and strict
and are defined as follows: vws(x
s) = vxs(y
s) = 3 for all s ∈ S; vys(ws) = vys(ws
′
) = −1 for
all s, s′ ∈ S; vys(zr) = 1 if r ∈ s and vys(zr) = −7 if r /∈ s; vzr (zr
′
) = 1/(|R| − 1) for any
r, r′ ∈ R; and va(b) = −7 for any a, b ∈ N and a 6= b for which va(b) is not already defined.
The partition pi in the instance ((N,P), pi) is {{xs, ys}, {ws} | s ∈ S}} ∪ {{zr | r ∈ R}}.
We see that the utilities of the players are as follows: upi(w
s) = 0 for all s ∈ S; upi(xs) =
upi(y
s) = 3 for all s ∈ S; and upi(z
r) = 1 for all r ∈ R.
Assume that there exists S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is a partition of R. Then we prove that
pi is not Pareto optimal and there exists another partition pi′ of N which Pareto dominates
pi. We form another partition pi′ = {{xs, ws} | s ∈ S′} ∪ {{ys, zi, zj, zk} | s ∈ S′ ∧ i, j, k ∈
s} ∪ {{xs, ys}, {ws} | s ∈ (S \ S′)}}.
In that case, upi′(w
s) = 3 for all s ∈ S′; upi′(ws) = 0 for all s ∈ S\S′; upi(xs) = upi(ys) = 3
for all s ∈ S; and upi(zr) = 1+2/(|R|−1) for all r ∈ R. Whereas the utilities of no player in
pi′ decreases, the utility of some players in pi′ is more than in pi. Since pi′ Pareto dominates
pi, pi is not Pareto optimal.
We now show that if there exists no S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is a partition of R, then pi is
Pareto optimal. We note that −7 is a sufficiently large negative valuation to ensure that
if va(b) = vb(a) = −7, then a, b ∈ N cannot be in the same coalition in a Pareto optimal
partition. For the sake of contradiction, assume that pi is not Pareto optimal and there
exists a partition pi′ which Pareto dominates pi. We will see that if there exists a player
i ∈ N such that upi′ > upi, then there exists at least one j ∈ N such that upi′ < upi. The
only players whose utility can increase (without causing some other player to be less happy)
are {xs | s ∈ S}, {ws | s ∈ S} or {zr | r ∈ R}. We consider these player classes separately.
If the utility of player xs increases, it can only increase from 3 to 6 so that xs is in the same
coalition as ys and ws. However, this means that ys gets a decreased utility. The utility of
ys can increase or stay the same only if it forms a coalition with some zrs. However in that
case, to satisfy all zrs, there needs to exist an S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is a partition of R.
Assume the utility of a player ws for s ∈ S increases. This is only possible if ws is in the
same coalition as xs. Clearly, the coalition formed is {ws, xs} because coalition {ws, xs, ys}
brings a utility of 2 to ys. In that case ys needs to form a coalition {ys, zi, zj , zk} where
s = {i, j, k}. If ys forms a coalition {ys, zi, zj , zk}, then all players ys
′
for s′ ∈ (S \{s}) need
to form coalitions of the form {ys
′
, zi′ , zj′ , zk′} such that s
′ = {i′, j′, k′}. Otherwise, their
utility of 3 decreases. This is only possible if there exists a set S′ ⊆ S of R such that S′ is
a partition of R.
Assume that there exists a partition pi′ that Pareto dominates pi and the utility of a
player upi′(z
r) > upi(z
r) for some r ∈ R. This is only possible if each zr forms the coalition
of the form {zr, zr
′
, zr
′′
, ys} where s = {r, r′, r′′}. This can only happen if there exists a set
S′ ⊆ S of R such that S′ is a partition of R.
The fact that checking whether a partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete has no
obvious implications on the complexity of computing a Pareto optimal partition. In fact
there is a simple polynomial-time algorithm to compute a partition which is Pareto optimal
for strict preferences.
Theorem 4. For strict preferences, a Pareto optimal partition can be computed in polyno-
mial time.
Proof. The statement follows from an application of serial dictatorship. Serial dictator-
ship (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998) is a well-known mechanism in resource allocation
in which an arbitrary player is chosen as the ‘dictator’ who is then given his most favored
allocation and the process is repeated until all players or resources have been dealt with. In
the context of coalition formation, serial dictatorship is well-defined if preferences of players
over coalitions are strict. Serial dictatorship is also well-defined for ASHGs with strict pref-
erences as the dictator forms a coalition with all the players he strictly likes who have been
not considered as dictators or are not already in some dictator’s coalition. The resulting
partition pi is such that for any other partition pi′, at least one dictator will strictly prefer pi
to pi′. Therefore pi is Pareto optimal.
A standard criticism of Pareto optimality is that it can lead to inherently unfair allo-
cations. To address this criticism, the algorithm can be modified to obtain less lopsided
partitions. Whenever an arbitrary player is selected to become the dictator among the
remaining players, choose a player that does not get extremely high elitist social welfare
among the remaining players. Nevertheless, even this modified algorithm may output an
partition that fails to be individually rational.
We know that the set of partitions which are both Pareto optimal and individually
rational is non-empty. Repeated Pareto improvements on individually rational partition
consisting of singletons leads to a Pareto optimal and individually rational partition. We
show that computing a Pareto optimal and individually rational partition for ASHGs is
weakly NP-hard.
Theorem 5. Computing a Pareto optimal and individually rational partition is weakly NP-
hard.
Proof. Consider the decision problem SubsetSumZero in which an instance consists of a set
of k integer weights A = {a1, . . . , ak} and the question is whether there exists a non-empty
S ⊆ A such that
∑
s∈S s = 0? Since SubsetSum for positive integers is NP-complete, it fol-
lows that SubsetSumZero is also NP-complete.4 Therefore, MaximalSubsetSumZero,
the problem of finding a maximal cardinality subset S ⊆ A such that
∑
s∈S s = 0 is NP-hard.
We prove the theorem by a reduction from MaximalSubsetSumZero. Reduce an
instance of I of MaximalSubsetSumZero to an instance I ′ = (N,P) where (N,P) is an
ASHG defined in the following way: N = {x, y1, y2} ∪ Z where Z = {zi | i ∈ {1, . . . , k};
vx(y1) = vx(y2) = k + 1; vx(zi) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}; vy1(zi) = −vzi(y1) = −vy2(zi) =
vzi(y2) = ai for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}; and va(b) = 0 for any a, b ∈ N for which va(b) is not
already defined.
First, we show that in an individually rational partition pi, no player except x gets positive
utility, i.e., upi(b) = 0 for all b ∈ N \ {x}. Assume that w.l.o.g y1 gets positive utility in
pi. This implies there exist a subset Z ′ = Z ∩ pi(y1) such that
∑
z∈Z′ vy1(z) > 0. Then
there exists z ∈ Z ′ such that vy1(z) > 0 which means that vz(y1) < 0. Due to individual
rationality, y2 ∈ pi(z) = pi(y1). But if y1 ∈ pi(y2), then upi(y2) =
∑
z∈Z′ −vy1(z) < 0 and pi
is not individually rational.
Assume that there exists a zi ∈ Z such that upi(zi) > 0. Then without loss of generality
vzi(y1) > 0 and due to individual rationality y1 ∈ pi(zi). Again due to individual rationality,
y1 needs to be with another zj such that vy1(zj) > 0. And again due to individual rationality,
zj needs to be with y2. This means, that for each zl ∈ pi(zi) ∩ Z, upi(zl) = al − al = 0.
We show that in every Pareto optimal and individually rational partition pi, we have
y1, y2 ∈ pi(x). For any other partition pi′, in which this does not hold, upi′(x) ≤ 2k + 1 <
2k + 2 = upi(x).
Consider an S ⊆ A and let piSz be any partition of {zi | ai ∈ A \ S}. The claim
is that pi is a Pareto optimal and individually rational partition if and only if pi is of the
form {{x, y1, y2} ∪ {zi | ai ∈ S}} ∪ piSz where S ⊆ A is the maximal subset such that∑
s∈S s = 0. Assume that S ⊆ A is not a maximal subset such that
∑
s∈S s = 0. If∑
s∈S s 6= 0, there exists a y ∈ {y1, y2} such that upi(y) < 0. If S is not maximal then there
is a larger set S′ and a corresponding partition pi′ = {{x, y1, y2} ∪ {zi | ai ∈ S′}} ∪ piS
′
z with
upi(x) = |S| < |S
′| = upi′(x) and upi(b) = upi′(b) for all b ∈ N \ {x}. For any other S
′ ⊆ A
such that |S′| > |S|, we know that
∑
s′∈S′ ≤ 0 which implies that there is a y ∈ {y1, y2}
which gets negative utility.
5 Complexity of envy-freeness
Envy-freeness is a desirable property in resource allocation, especially in cake cutting
settings. Lipton et al. (2004) proposed envy-minimization in different ways and examined
the complexity of minimizing envy in resource allocation settings. Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002) mentioned envy-freeness in hedonic games but focused on stability. We already
know that envy-freeness can be easily achieved by the partition of singletons.5 Therefore,
4We note that in any instance of SubsetSum all zeros in the set A can be omitted to obtain an equivalent
problem. Reduce SubsetSum to SubsetSumZero by adding ak+1 = −W to A.
5The partition of singletons also satisfies individual rationality.
in conjunction with envy-freeness, we seek to satisfy other properties such as stability or
Pareto optimality. A partition is Nash stable if there is no incentive for a player to be deviate
to another (possibly empty) coalition. For symmetric ASHGs, it is known that Nash stable
partitions always exist and they correspond to partitions for which the utilitarian social
welfare is a local optimum (see, e.g., Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002). We now show that
for symmetric ASHGs, there may not exist any partition which is both envy-free and Nash
stable.
Example 1. Consider an ASHG (N,P) where N = {1, 2, 3} and P is defined as follows:
v1(2) = v2(1) = 3, v1(3) = v3(1) = 3 and v2(3) = v3(2) = −7. Then there exists no partition
which is both envy-free and Nash stable.
We use the game in Example 1 as a gadget to prove the following.6
Theorem 6. For symmetric preferences, checking whether there exists a partition which is
both envy-free and Nash stable is NP-complete in the strong sense.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP since envy-freeness and Nash stability can be verified in
polynomial time. We reduce the problem from E3C. Let (R,S) be an instance of E3C where
R is a set and S is a collection of subsets of R such that |R| = 3m for some positive integerm
and |s| = 3 for each s ∈ S. We will use the fact that E3C remains NP-complete even if each
r ∈ R occurs in at most three members of S. (R,S) can be reduced to an instance (N,P)
where (N,P) is an ASHG defined in the following way. LetN = {ys | s ∈ S}∪{zr1, z
r
2 , z
r
3 | r ∈
R}. We set all preferences as symmetric. The players preferences are as follows: for all r ∈ R,
vzr
1
(zr2) = vzr2 (z
r
1) = 3, vzr1 (z
r
3) = 3 and vzr2 (z
r
3) = vzr3 (z
r
2) = −7; for all s = {i, j, k} ∈ S,
vzi
1
(zj1) = vzi
1
(zk1 ) = vzj
1
(zk1 ) = 1/10 and vys(z
i
1) = vys(z
j
1) = vys(z
k
1 ) = 28/10; and for all
a, b ∈ N for which valuations have not been defined, va(b) = vb(a) = −7
We note that −7 is a sufficiently large negative valuation to ensure that if va(b) = vb(a) =
−7, then a and b will get negative utility if they are in the same coalition. We show that
there exists an envy-free and Nash stable partition for (N,P) if and only if (R,S) is a ‘yes’
instance of E3C.
Assume that there exists S′ ⊆ S such that S′ is a partition of R. Then there exists a
partition pi = {{ys, zi1, z
j
1, z
k
1} | s = {i, j, k} ∈ S
′} ∪ {{zr2}, {z
r
3} | r ∈ R} ∪ {{s} | s ∈ S \S
′}.
It is easy to see that partition pi is Nash stable and envy-free. Players zr1 and z
r
3 both had
an incentive to be with each other when they are singletons. However, each zr1 now gets
utility 3 by being in a coalition with zr
′
1 , z
r′′
1 and y
s where s = {r, r′, r′′} ∈ S. Therefore
zr1 has no incentive to be with z
r
3 and z
r
3 has no incentive to join {z
r′
1 , z
r′
1 , z
r′′
1 , y
s} because
vzr
3
(zr
′
1 ) = vzr3 (z
r′′
1 ) = vzr3 (y
s) = −7. Similarly, no player is envious of another player.
Assume that there exists no partition S′ ⊆ S of R such that S′ is a partition of R. Then,
there exists at least one r ∈ R such that zi1 is not in the coalition of the form {z
r
1, z
r′
1 , z
r′′
1 , y
s}
where s = {r, r′, r′′} ∈ S. Then the only individually rational coalitions which zr1 can form
and get utility at least 3 are the following {zr1, z
r
3}, {z
r
1 , z
r
2}. In the first case, z
r
1 wants to
deviate to {zr3}. In the second case, z
r
2 is envious and wants to replace z
r
3 . Therefore, there
exists no partition which is both Nash stable and envy-free.
While the existence of a Pareto optimal partition and an envy-free partition is guaran-
teed, we show that checking whether there exists a partition which is both envy-free and
Pareto optimal is hard.
Theorem 7. Checking whether there exists a partition which is both Pareto optimal and
envy-free is Σp2-complete.
6Example 1 and the proof of Theorem 6 also apply to the combination of envy-freeness and individual
stability where individual stability is a variant of Nash stability (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002).
Proof. The problem has a ‘yes’ instance if there exists an envy-free partition that Pareto
dominates every other partition. Therefore the problem is in the complexity class NPcoNP =
Σp2.
We prove hardness by a reduction from a problem concerning resource allocation (with
additive utilities) (de Keijzer et al., 2009). A resource allocation problem is a tuple (I,X,w)
where I is a set of agents, X is a set of indivisible objects and w : I ×X → R is a weight
function. An a : I → 2X is an allocation if for all i, j ∈ I such that i 6= j, we have
a(i) ∩ a(j) = ∅. The resultant utility of each agent i ∈ I is then
∑
x∈a(i) w(i, x). It was
shown by de Keijzer et al. (2009) that the problem ∃-EEF-ADD of checking the existence
of an envy-free and Pareto optimal allocation is Σp2-complete.
Now, consider an instance (I,X,w) of ∃-EEF-ADD and reduce it to an instance (N,P)
of an ASHG where N = I ∪X and P is specified by the following values: vi(xj) = w(i, xj)
and vxj (i) = 0 for all i ∈ I, xj ∈ X ; vxk(xj) = vxj (xk) = 0 for all xj , xk; and vi(j) = vj(i) =
−W · |I ∪ X | for all i, j ∈ I where W =
∑
i∈I,xj∈X
|w(i, xj)|. It can then be shown that
there exists a Pareto optimal and envy-free partition in (N,P) if and only if (I,X,w) is a
‘yes’ instance of ∃-EEF-ADD. The proof is omitted due to space limitations.
The results of this section show that, even though envy-freeness can be trivially satisfied
on its own, it becomes much more delicate when considered in conjunction with other
desirable properties.
6 Conclusions
We studied the complexity of partitions that satisfy standard criteria of fairness and opti-
mality in additively separable hedonic games. We showed that computing a partition with
maximum egalitarian or utilitarian social welfare is NP-hard in the strong sense and com-
puting an individually rational and Pareto optimal partition is weakly NP-hard. A Pareto
optimal partition can be computed in polynomial time when preferences are strict. Inter-
estingly, checking whether a given partition is Pareto optimal is coNP-complete even in the
restricted setting of strict and symmetric preferences.
We also showed that checking the existence of partition which satisfies not only envy-
freeness but an additional property like Nash stability or Pareto optimality is computa-
tionally hard. The complexity of computing a Pareto optimal partition for ASHGs with
general preferences is still open. Other directions for future research include approxima-
tion algorithms to compute maximum utilitarian or egalitarian social welfare for different
representations of hedonic games.
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